Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive that provides authentication (signing) and confidentiality (encrypting) simultaneously at a lower computational cost and communication overhead. With the proposition of certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC), certificateless signcryption (CLSC) scheme has gradually become a research hotspot and attracted extensive attentions. However, many of previous CLSC schemes are constructed based on time-consuming pairing operation, which is impractical for mobile devices with limited computation ability and battery capacity. Although researchers have proposed pairing-free CLSC schemes to solve the issue of efficiency, many of them are in fact still insecure. Therefore, the challenging problem is to keep the balance between efficiency and security in CLSC schemes. In this paper, several existing CLSC schemes are cryptanalyzed and a new CLSC scheme without pairing based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) is presented. The proposed CLSC scheme is provably secure against indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) and existential unforgeability under adaptive chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) resting on Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption and discrete logarithm problem in the random oracle model. Furthermore, the proposed scheme resists the ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack, public key replacement (PKR) attack, malicious but passive KGC (MPK) attack, and presents efficient computational overhead compared with the existing related CLSC schemes.
Introduction
Traditional public key infrastructure (TPKI) cryptosystem [1] , which suffers from complicated public key certificate management, is impractical for mobile devices with limited computation ability and battery capacity. An effective substitution for traditional PKI cryptosystem without the operation of certificate is identity-based (ID-based) cryptosystem initially proposed by Shamir [2] , in which the public key of the user is easily computed from the identity of the user such as IP address or email address, while the private key is generated from the identity of the user and a master secret key of a key generator center (KGC) known as a trusted authority. To reduce the heavy trust reliance on KGC, in 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] presented a novel concept called certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC), in which long-term private key of the user is calculated from a secret key of the user, while partial private key of the user is issued by KGC. In this way, CLPKC-based protocols eliminate the complex certificate management burden and the insecure key escrow problem, which respectively consists in TPKI and ID-based cryptosystems.
In information and network applications, encryption technique and digital signature are two fundamental mechanisms explored to match specific security requirements, including confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation and authentication. Traditionally, signing and encrypting the message are independent with an encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Signcryption, put forward by Zheng [4] in 1997, is a cryptographic primitive that provides authentication (signing) and confidentiality (encrypting) simultaneously, at a lower computational cost and communication overhead. Previously, researchers constructed signcryption schemes based on TPKI and ID-based cryptosystems. Recently, the explosive growth of security and performance requirements has necessitated extensive researches on certificateless signcryption (CLSC) schemes owing to the satisfactory performances of CLPKC.
Related studies
Certificateless signcryption (CLSC) schemes can be divided into two categories according to the way of computing in the schemes, (1) Pairing-based CLSC schemes, (2) Pairing-free CLSC schemes.
CLSC scheme was firstly put forward by Barbosa and Farshim [5] in 2008 and previous CLSC schemes were relying on costly bilinear pairing operations. In traditional pairing-based CLSC schemes, a particular collection of a message part is required to be signcrypted and sent. That means a large message should be divided into several sections, each of which should match the size of input for signcryption in signcrypt algorithm. Hereafter, many traitional CLSC schemes [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] relying on pairing operations have been proposed. In 2008, Aranha et al. [6] and Wu et al. [7] proposed two schemes separately. In 2010, Liu et al. [9] figured out that Barbosa and Farshim's CLSC scheme [5] was insecure under malicious but passive KGC (MPK) attack [14] and constructed an improved one, which was unfortunately proved to be insecure against MPK attack either, as indicated by Weng et al. [15] . That same year, Selvi et al. also demonstrated security weaknesses of the schemes [5] [6] [7] in their literature [16] . Compared with CLSC schemes [7] and [9] , Xie et al. [8] improved a more efficient one, which was, however, vulnerable to ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack [17] , as analyzed by Hafizul Islam et al. [10] , who then proposed a leakage-free CLSC scheme with security against ESL attack in the random oracle model in 2015.
Besides, there were some untraditional pairing-based CLSC schemes proposed by reseachers. In 2013, Li et al. [11] generated a novel hybrid CLSC scheme, in which a message should not be divided into appropriate sections. In such a construction, a symmetric key, which will be used to encrypt the actual message later, is signcrypted and sent from the signer. It is worthwhile to analyze such different paradigm from traditional research works, because a signcrypt algorithm is also adopted in their schemes. A symmetric key is signcrypted in such special schemes, while a section of the message is signcryped in traditional ones. In addition, in 2014, Zhou et al. [12] introduced a provable certificateless generalized signcryption scheme, which could adaptively work as an encryption scheme, a signature scheme or a signcryption scheme with only one algorithm. Such algorithms running in signcryption mode, which are equivalent to the traditional CLSC schemes, are also worth discussing in our research works.With studies on the two schemes above, Yin et al. [13] demonstrated that these two schemes were inefficient with higher computation cost compared with their own proposed improved scheme.
Nevertheless, all CLSC schemes mentioned above are relying on costly bilinear pairing operations, which are impractical for mobile devices with limited computation ability and battery capacity.
Therefore, it is significant and challenging to come up with secure and efficient pairing-free CLSC schemes, which provide more security properties without complicated operations. In 2010, Selvi et al. [16] presented the first provably secure CLSC scheme without bilinear pairing and validated it in the random oracle model. Among the existing pairing-free CLSC schemes [18] [19] [20] , He [21] claimed that scheme [19] failed to achieve unforgeability property when the Type I adversary executed attacks. In 2014, Shi et al. [22] claimed that all the CLSC schemes in [18] [19] [20] provided neither unforgeability nor confidentiality property against the Type I adversary. Moreover, in 2014, Lu et al. [23] proposed a certificate-based signcryption scheme without costly bilinear operations. The ceriticate produced by the Certify algorithm in their scheme is equivalent to the partial private key produced by the Extract Partial Private Key algorithm in traditional CLSC schemes. Lu et al. claimed that the ceriticates could be sent to the users publicly, which resolved the distribution problem in CLPKC. However, security model in their scheme includes a Type I adversary who has no access to the certificates, which is contradictory to the Certify algorithm. In fact, Lu et al.'s scheme is an implicit CLSC scheme.
Some recent research works on pairing-based and pairing-free CLSC schemes are summarized in Fig. 1 and Fig.2 respectively. Researchers at the end of the arrow indicated that the schemes proposed by the researchers at the beginning of the arrow was either insecure or incorrect. Besides, there was no impoved CLSC schemes presented in [15] and [21] . 2008 Barbosa et al. [5] 2008 Aranha et al. [6] 2008 Wu et al. [7] 2010 Selvi et al. [ 
Our contribitions
In this paper, we analyze schemes [11-13, 16, 22] by concrete cryptanalysis. All these schemes are vulnerable to ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack, public key replacement (PKR) attack, malicious but passive KGC (MPK) attack, and not secure enough to provide confidentiality or unforgeability property. Motivated by the prior research works, we construct a secure and efficient pairing-free CLSC scheme based on ECC. Compared with existing CLSC schemes, our proposed scheme achieves greater security with lower computation cost.
Preliminaries

Security assumption based on ECC
Let F p be a finite prime field with a large prime number p. An elliptic curve E over the finite field F p is the set of all pairs satisfying the equation 2 ( ) = 3 + + ( ), , ∈ , ∆= 4 3 + 27 2 ( ) ≠ 0, along with an imaginary point representing the infinity. An additive group G p of all points on elliptic curve E includes addition operation.
Let P be a generator of G p . Let the order of G p be an integer q. Let * = [1, − 1]. Following computational problems over the elliptic curve E are frequently used in cryptographic protocols. The probability to solve these problems is negligible with any polynomial time algorithm.
Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem: for unknown ∈ * , by giving , , ∈ / , compute .
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: for unknown , ∈ * , by giving , , , ∈ / , compute . Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: for unknown , , ∈ * , by giving , , , , ∈ / , decide whether = . Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem: for unknown , ∈ * , by giving , , , ∈ / and an oracle DDH( , , ), that outputs 1 if = , otherwise 0, compute .
Structure of CLSC schemes
Notions used in this paper are listed in Table 1 . CLSC scheme, which consists of seven polynomial time algorithms, can be summarized in 
Security model
Adversary model
There are two kinds of adversaries in CLPKC. 1 , as a dishonest user, can replace the public key of any user with a value x i of his choice, but cannot access the master secret key of KGC. 2 , as a malicious but passive KGC, cannot replace the public keys, but can obtain the master secret key of KGC.
Security model
The security model is defined as an attack game between an adversary ∈ { 1 , 2 } and a challenger ∁ in a series of simulated potential attacking scenarios. The adversary, simulated as a user, asks the challenger for a polynomial number of queries, while the challenger issues the replies using the following oracles. Steps of the Game IND-CCA2 are described as follows.
(C1) The challenger ∁ executes the SETUP algorithm in the CLSC scheme. For adversary 1 , the challenger ∁ sends system params to 1 but keeps s in secret. For adversary 2 , the challenger ∁ sends system params and s to 2 .
(C2) The adversary asks the challenger ∁ for a polynomial number of the queries. (C3) The adversary chooses accepted sender * , accepted receiver * (defined in Definition 2 and 3 below) and two random messages 0 , 1 to ask a challenging. The challenger ∁ picks randomly ∈ {0,1} and computes * . Then ∁ returns * to .
(C4) The adversary asks queries as done in step (C2), keeping * and * being accepted.
(C5) When terminating the game, ( 1 or 2 ) makes a guess bit ′ . If ′ = , wins the game.
The advantage of for winning the game is defined as
|. Definition 2 (acceptable sender and receiver against 1 for confidentiality). For 1 , Rx S , Rpk S , Rx R and Rpk R are always accepted. Then, the sender and receiver are accepted if none of the following condition holds.
(1) 1 either raises the query Rsk R or Rd R .
(2) 1 either asks the query Rsk S or Rd S .
(3) 1 raises query R usc ( * , * , * ). Definition 3 (acceptable sender and receiver against 2 for confidentiality). For 2 , Rd S , and Rd R are always accepted. The sender and receiver are accepted if none of the following condition holds.
(1) 2 either raises the query Rsk R or Rx R (Rpk R ).
(2) 2 either asks the query Rsk S or Rx S (Rpk S ).
(3) 2 raises query R usc ( * , * , * ). Definition 4 (Unforgeability): A CLSC scheme is secure against unforgeability under adaptive chosen-messages attacks (EUF-CMA) only if the probability for attackers to win the following game is negligible with any polynomial time algorithm.
Steps of the Game EUF-CMA are described as follows.
(U1), (U2) The same as the steps (C1) and (C2) in Game IND-CCA2. (U3) The adversary chooses accepted sender * (defined in Definition 5 and 6 below) and a user * , outputs * on a chosen messages * .
(U4) ∁ executes unsigncryption algorithm with input as ( * , * , * ). If ∁ outputs = * , wins the game. The advantage of for winning the game is defined as
Definition 5 (acceptable sender against 1 for unforgeability). For 1 , Rx S and Rpk S are always accepted. The sender is accepted if none of the following condition holds.
(1) 1 either raises the query Rsk S or Rd S .
(2) ( * , * , * ) is not produced by signcryption algorithm with ( * , * , * ).
Definition 6 (acceptable sender against 2 for unforgeability). For 2 , Rd S and Rd R are always accepted. The sender is accepted if none of the following condition holds.
(1) 2 either raises the query Rsk S or Rx S (Rpk S ).
(2) ( * , * , * ) is not produced by signcryption algorithm with ( * , * , * ). Definition 7 (public key replacement (PKR) attack). A CLSC scheme resists public key replacement attack only if 1 cannot win Game IND-CCA2 and Game EUF-CMA.
Definition 8 (malicious but passive KGC (MPK) attack). A CLSC scheme resists malicious but passive KGC attack only if 2 cannot win Game IND-CCA2 and Game EUF-CMA.
Definition 9 (ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack). A CLSC scheme resists ESL attack means that even if the attacker 1 or 2 is allowed to ask Rr i query, he cannot win Game IND-CCA2 and Game EUF-CMA.
Security definition
Definition 10 (secure CLSC scheme). A CLSC scheme is secure when it matches the following conditions.
(1) The sender generates the ciphertext with private keys of his own and public keys of the receiver, and the receiver recovers the correct plaintext from with private keys of his own and public keys of the sender. Such correctness of a CLSC scheme can be defined as the following.
= USC(SC� , , , , , ,
Analysis on related CLSC schemes
In this section, we demonstrate the security weaknesses of several existing CLSC schemes. We find that all of them are vulnerable to ESL attack, MPK attack, PKR attack and fail to provide confidentiality and unforgeability under our security model. [12] and [11] Scheme [12] is briefly described as follows. Setup: KGC chooses ∈ * and computes = . SetSecretValue: The user randomly chooses ∈ * , makes = as public key. ExtractPartialPrivateKey KGC computes partial private key as = = 1 ( ). SetPrivateKey The user owns ( , ) as private key. SetPublicKey The user owns as public key.
Analysis on scheme
Signcrypt
In their scheme, when ∉ ∅, ∉ ∅, then ( ) = ( ) =1, algorithm runs in signcryption mode. The signer computes the ciphertext = ( , , ) in the signcryption phase as follows:
The signer computes ∈ * , = , = � , � , ℎ = 2 ( , , , , , ,
Attacks
The attacker, who gets the ephemeral private key with query Rr S , can compute ℎ and get the message with = ⨁ℎ. 1 can compute the partial private key as = − − ′ with queries Rr S and Rx S , 2 can compute the secret key as = ( − − )/ ′ with queries Rr S and Rd S . Based on the proof above, scheme [12] cannot withstand ESL attack, MPK attack, PKR attack and fails to provide confidentiality and unforgeability.
Most phases in scheme [11] and [12] are the same. Similarly, Scheme [11] is insecure when the attacker knows random numbers and . [13] Scheme [13] is briefly described as follows. Setup: KGC chooses ∈ * and computes = . SetSecretValue: The user randomly chooses ∈ * , makes = as public key. ExtractPartialPrivateKey: KGC computes = , = 1 ( || ). SetPrivateKey The user owns ( , ) as private key.
Analysis on scheme
Signcrypt
In [13] , the signer computes the ciphertext = ( , ℎ, , ) in the signcryption phase as follows:
The attacker, who gets the ephemeral private keys 1 , 2 with query Rr S , can compute the symmetric key and get the message = ( ). 1 can compute the partial private key as = ℎ −1 − 2 with queries Rr S . 2 can compute the secret key as = ℎ −1 ( − 1 ) with queries Rr S .
Scheme [13] , which cannot withstand ESL attack, MPK attack and PKR attack, fails to provide confidentiality and unforgeability. [16] Scheme [16] is briefly described as follows. Setup: KGC computes = , in which is the master private key of KGC, is the public key of KGC.
Analysis on scheme
SetSecretValue: The user randomly chooses , makes = as public key. ExtractPartialPrivateKey KGC randomly chooses 0 , 1 , computes 0 = 0 , 1 = 1 , 0 = 1 ( , 0 ), 1 = 1 ( , 0 , 1 ), 0 = 0 + 0 , 1 = 1 + 1 . 0 is set as partial private key. SetPrivateKey The user owns ( , 0 ) as private key. SetPublicKey The user owns = ( 1 , 0 , 1 , ) as public key. The signer computes the ciphertext = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) in the signcryption phase as follows: Signcrypt The signer Chooses the ephemeral private keys 1 , 2 ∈ * , computes 1 [16] , which cannot withstand ESL attack, MPK attack and PKR attack, fails to provide confidentiality and unforgeability. [22] Scheme [22] is briefly described as follows. Setup: KGC computes = , in which is the master private key of KGC, is the public key of KGC.
SetSecretValue: The user randomly chooses , makes = as public key. ExtractPartialPrivateKey KGC randomly chooses , computes = , = + 1 ( , ). SetPrivateKey The user owns ( , ) as private key. SetPublicKey The user owns ( , ) as public key. The signer computes the ciphertext = ( 1 , 2 , 3 ) in the signcryption phase as follows:
Signcrypt
The signer Chooses ,
The attacker, who gets the ephemeral private keys with query Rr S , can compute the message with = � ℎ � and = 3 ( )⨁ 2 . 1 can compute the partial private key as = 3 ( + ℎ) − with queries Rr S and Rx S . 2 can compute the secret key as = ( 3 ( + ℎ) − )/ with queries Rr S and Rd S .
Scheme [22] , which cannot withstand ESL attack, MPK attack and PKR attack, fails to provide confidentiality and unforgeability.
Our proposed CLSC scheme
Motivated by the structure of previous CLSC schemes, we propose a novel CLSC scheme without pairing based on ECC as shown in Fig. 3 . Our scheme consists of two phases: registration, signcrypt &unsigncrypt. . is set as partial private key. SetPrivateKey The user owns ( , ) as private key. SetPublicKey The user owns = ( , ) as public key. The user verifies whether = + 0 ( , , ) = or not.
(2) Signcrypt &Unsigncrypt phase Signcrypt
The signer chooses randomly ∈ * , computes = ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ), = + 0 ( , , ) , = ( ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) )( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ), = ⨁ 1 ( ), = 2 ( , , , , , ), = 3 ( , , , , , ), = � 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , )� + + . Then, the signer transmits ciphertext = ( , , ) to the receiver. Unsigncrypt After receiving σ = ( , , ), the receiver executes the unsigncryption algorithm as follows. The receiver computes = + 0 ( , , ) , = ( ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ), = ⨁ 1 ( ), = 2 ( , , , , , ), = 3 ( , , , , , ) , The receiver will accept if = + + holds.
Analysis of our proposed CLSC scheme
Security analysis
According to the definition in section 2.3.3, our CLSC scheme is secure under the GDH assumption and DL problem.
Theorem 1 Our scheme is correct. Proof. Our scheme is correct because of the following. After receiving = ( , , ) , the receiver computes = + 0 ( , , ) = , = ( ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ) = ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) )( ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ) = ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) )( ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ) = ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) )(( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ) So, the receiver recovers with = ⨁ 1 ( ). Then, the receiver verifies with = 2 ( , , , , , ), = 3 ( , , , , , ), = ( � 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , )� + + ) = ( � 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , )� + + ) = ( 4 ( , ) + 4 ( , ) ) + + = + + . 
and R usc is . The challenger ∁ maintains the query lists for consistency. 0 : a tuple of � , , , ℎ 0 �. 1 : a tuple of � , ℎ 1 �. 2 : a tuple of � , , , , , , ℎ 2 �. 3 : a tuple of � , , , , , , ℎ 3 �. 4 : a tuple of � , , ℎ 4 �.
:a tuple of � , , , , , , ℎ 0 � :a tuple of � , , , �, σ = ( , , ) Lemma 1. Given an instance of the GDH problem: For unknown , ∈ * , by giving , , , ∈ / and an oracle DDH, compute . Suppose 1 win the Game IND-CCA2 with advantage and running time , then an algorithm can be constructed to solve the above instance of the GDH problem with advantage ε ′ and running time by interacting with 1 .
To interact with 1 , algorithm simulates as ∁ and runs the following steps to solve the above instance of the GDH problem with the help of 1 .
(C1) executes the SETUP algorithm and sends system params to 1 .
(C2) Suppose that will choose accepted sender S with identity * and accepted receiver R with identity * for challenge in the next step. 1 asks the for a polynomial number of the queries. query: On receiving ( , , ), performs as follows: 1) If 0 contains a tuple of ( , , , ℎ 0 ), returns ℎ 0 to 1 . 2) Otherwise, a) If ≠ , , randomly chooses ℎ 0 and inserts � , , , ℎ 0 � to 0 and returns ℎ 0 to 1 . b) Otherwise, gets ℎ 0 from , inserts � , , , ℎ 0 � to 0 and returns ℎ 0 to 1 . Create(ID i ): On receiving ( ), performs as follows: 1) If contains a tuple of � , , , , , , ℎ 0 �. a) If ≠ , , returns all the elements of the tuple to 1 . b) Otherwise, returns � , ⊥, , , , , ℎ 0 � to 1 . 2) Otherwise, a) If ≠ , , then randomly chooses , , , computes = , = , asks 0 query to get ℎ 0 , then computes = + ℎ 0 , inserts � , , , , , , ℎ 0 � to and returns� , , , , , , ℎ 0 � to 1 . b) Otherwise, randomly chooses , , ℎ 0 , computes = , = − ℎ 0 , = − ℎ 0 , inserts � , ⊥, , , , , ℎ 0 � to , inserts ( , , , ℎ 0 ) to 0 and returns � , ⊥, , , , , ℎ 0 � to 1 .
All the following queries should be asked after Create(ID i ) query: On receiving ( ), performs as follows: If 1 contains a tuple of � , ℎ 1 �, returns ℎ 1 to 1 . Otherwise, randomly chooses ℎ 1 and inserts � , ℎ 1 � to 1 and returns ℎ 1 to 1 .
query: On receiving � , , , , , �, performs as follows: If 2 contains a tuple of � , , , , , , ℎ 2 �, returns ℎ 2 to 1 . Otherwise, randomly chooses ℎ 2 and inserts � , , , , , , ℎ 2 � to 2 and returns ℎ 2 to 1 . query: On receiving � , , , , , �, performs as follows: If 3 contains a tuple of � , , , , , , ℎ 3 �, returns ℎ 3 to 1 . Otherwise, randomly chooses ℎ 3 and inserts � , , , , , , ℎ 3 � to 3 and returns ℎ 3 to 1 . query: On receiving ( , ), performs as follows: If 4 contains a tuple of � , , ℎ 4 �, returns ℎ 4 to 1 . Otherwise, randomly chooses ℎ 4 and inserts � , , ℎ 4 � to 4 and returns ℎ 4 to 1 .
Rd i query: On receiving , performs as follows: 1) If ≠ , , returns from to 1 . 2) Otherwise, the game is aborted. Rx i query:. On receiving , returns from to 1 . Rsk i query: should be asked after Create(ID i ). On receiving , performs as follows: 1) If ≠ , , returns ( , ) from to 1 . 2) Otherwise, the game is aborted. With the above description, wins to solve the GDH problem only if when choosing * and * for challenge (i.e. event 1 ′ occurs), the game is completed. But, will terminate the game when any of the events 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 occurs. 1 : 1 does not choose both S with identity of * and R with identity * for challenge.
2 : 1 asks Rd i query with * or * ,
3 : 1 asks Rsk i query with * or * , . Then, if 1 win the Game IND-CCA2 with advantage and running time , then an algorithm can be constructed to solve the GDH problem with advantage ε ′ by interacting with 1 . 
To interact with 2 , algorithm runs the following steps to solve the instance of the GDH problem .
(C1) executes the SETUP algorithm and sends system params and master secret key s to 2 .
(C2) 2 asks for a polynomial number of the queries as shown in Lemma 1, answers the following queries differently. query: On receiving ( , , ), performs as follows: 1) If 0 contains a tuple of ( , , , ℎ 0 ), returns ℎ 0 to 1 . 2) Otherwise, randomly chooses ℎ 0 and inserts � , , , ℎ 0 � to 0 and returns ℎ 0 to 2) Otherwise, a) If ≠ , , randomly chooses , , , computes = , = , asks 0 query to get ℎ 0 , then computes = + ℎ 0 , inserts � , , , , , , ℎ 0 � to and returns� , , , , , , ℎ 0 � to 2 . b) Otherwise, randomly chooses , , sets = , = , gets ℎ 0 from 0 , computes = + ℎ 0 , inserts � , , ⊥, , , , ℎ 0 � to and returns � , , ⊥ , , , , ℎ 0 ) to 2 .
All the following queries should be asked after Create(ID i ). Rx i query: On receiving , performs as follows: 1) If ≠ , , returns from to 2 . 2) Otherwise, the game is aborted. Rd i query: On receiving , returns from to 2 . Rpk i query: On receiving , performs as follows: 1) If ≠ , , 2 randomly chooses ′ , computes ′ = ′ , updates all the tuples with = ′ , = ′ 2) Otherwise, the game is aborted. R sc ( , , ) query: performs the same steps as shown in Lemma 1 except the following steps.
1) If ≠ , , executes the same steps as shown in Lemma 1.
2) If = = , ≠ , , a) 2 gets ℎ 0 , ℎ 0 from 0 , gets , , , , from Create(ID j ), gets , , , 
Then, if 2 win the Game IND-CCA2 with advantage and running time , then an algorithm can be constructed to solve the GDH problem with advantage ε ′ and running time by interacting with 2 . Given an instance of the DL problem: For unknown ∈ * , by giving , ∈ / , compute .
Suppose 1 win the Game EUF-CMA with advantage and running time , then an algorithm can be constructed to solve the above instance of the DL problem with advantage ε ′ and running time by interacting with 1 .
To interact with 1 , algorithm simulates as ∁ and runs the following steps to solve the above instance of the DL problem with the help of 1 .
(U1) executes the SETUP algorithm and sends system params to 1 .
(U2) Suppose that will choose accepted sender S with identity * and a user * for challenge. 1 asks the for a polynomial number of the queries as shown in Lemma 1. Queries only contains conditions of ≠ and = , where receiver R should not be considered and specified.
(U3) The adversary 1 chooses accepted sender * and a user * , outputs * on a chosen messages * where σ * = ( * , * , * ).
(U4) ∁ executes unsigncryption algorithm with input as ( * , * , * ). If ∁ outputs = * , 1 wins the game. We get σ * * = ( * , * , * * ), * * = � ℎ 4 + ℎ 4 � + * * + * * * = * + * + * * * = * + * * + * * According to above expressions, we get = = * * − * + * − * * * * − * , ( * * ≠ * ), from which, we conclude that may solve the DL problem if successful birthday attack on 2 occurs. Failure birthday attack on 3 will generate * * = * , which does not affect the solution of the DL problem. The running time to compute is ≈ 3 , in which is the time for one scalar multiplication operation over * .
With the above description, wins to solve the DL problem only if when choosing * for challenge, successful birthday attack on 2 occurs and the game is completed. But, will terminate the game when any of the events 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 occurs. 
� 5 : 1 fails to use oracle 2 and replay technique to generate one more valid ciphertext.
Then, 1 will win the Game EUF-CMA with advantage and running time , then an algorithm can be constructed to solve the DL problem with advantage ε ′ and running time by interacting with 1 . 
To interact with 2 , algorithm runs the following steps to solve the instance of the DL problem .
(U1) executes the SETUP algorithm and sends system params and master secret key s to 2 .
(U2) Suppose that will choose accepted sender S with identity * and a user * for challenge. 2 asks the for a polynomial number of the queries as shown in Lemma 2. Queries only contains conditions of ≠ and = , where receiver R should not be considered and specified.
(U3)(U4) steps are the same as that in Lemma 3.
2 will get = = * * − * + * − * * * * − * , * * ≠ * , from which, we conclude that may solve the DL problem if successful birthday attack on 3 occurs. Failure birthday attack on 2 will generate * * = * , which does not affect the solution of the DL problem. The running time to compute is ≈ 3 . will terminate the game when any of the events 1 , 3 , 4 , 6 , 7 , 8 occurs. Similarly, 2 will win the Game EUF-CMA with advantage and running time , then an algorithm can be constructed to solve the DL problem with advantage ε ′ and running time by interacting with 2 . can solve the DL problem, which is contradictory with the security assumption of DL problem. Then, we conclude that cannot win the Game EUF-CMA and _ ( ) is negligible. Therefore, our scheme can provide unforgeability under the DL problem.
In light of the proof above, our proposed scheme can also resist the PKR attack, MPK attack and ESL attack.
Efficiency analysis
In this section, we evaluates our proposed scheme compared with other related ones. Table  3 lists the computation time cost for referred cryptographic operations from research works [25, 26] and the lengths of parameters. Besides, time for hash and xor operations are trivial and can be neglected in the comparison. Table 4 shows the efficiency of our scheme compared with related ones. Symbol √ denotes that the scheme supports the corresponding character while × denotes not. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrate the security weakness of several existing CLSC schemes, and present a CLSC scheme without pairing based on elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC). Security proof shows that our scheme is secure to provide confidentiality and unforgeability resting on Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption and discrete logarithm problem in the random oracle model. Compared with related CLSC schemes, the security and efficiency analysis show that our scheme satisfies more security characters with lowest time cost and slight higher communication cost.
